![]() Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. This is the very opposite of what is termed "island hopping" which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. MacArthur explained his and Admiral Halsey's strategy: MacArthur worked together with Admiral William Halsey, commander of the South Pacific Area but subordinate to MacArthur in Operation Cartwheel, in perfecting leapfrogging. MacArthur said his version of leapfrogging was different from what he called island hopping, which was the style favored by the Central Pacific Area commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz that favored direct assaults on heavily defended beaches and islands leading to massive casualties for such small parcels of land like at Tarawa, Peleliu, Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. MacArthur's Operation Cartwheel, Operation Reckless and Operation Persecution were the first successful Allied practices of leapfrogging in terms of landing on lightly guarded beaches and very low casualties but cutting off Japanese troops hundreds of miles away from their supply routes. While this strategy pre-dated World War II by many decades, MacArthur was the first Allied theater commander to practice this during the Allied offensive in the Pacific Theater. While MacArthur claimed to have invented the strategy, it initially came out of the Navy. This strategy began to be implemented in late 1943 in Operation Cartwheel. General Douglas MacArthur greatly supported this strategy in his effort to regain the Philippines from Japanese occupation. Thus troops on islands which had been bypassed, such as the major base at Rabaul, were useless to the Japanese war effort and left to "wither on the vine". This strategy was possible in part because the Allies used submarine and air attacks to blockade and isolate Japanese bases, weakening their garrisons and reducing the Japanese ability to resupply and reinforce them. The books were read not only by Americans but by senior officers of the Japanese Imperial Navy, who used "island-hopping" in their successful southeast Asia offensives in 19. Shortly afterward, a British reporter on naval affairs, Hector Charles Bywater, publicized the prospect of a Japanese-American war in his books Seapower in the Pacific (1921) and The Great Pacific War (1925), which detailed an island-hopping strategy. Marine Corps drafted "Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia," a plan for war against Japan which updated War Plan Orange by incorporating modern military technology (submarines, aircraft, etc.) and which again included an island-hopping strategy. Therefore, in 1921, Major Earl Hancock Ellis of the U.S. access to its interests in the western Pacific. If these islands were fortified, Japan could, in principle, deny the U.S. ![]() Īfter World War I, the Versailles Treaty gave Japan a mandate over former German colonies in the western Pacific specifically, the Mariana, Marshall, and the Caroline Islands. Rodgers, included an island-hopping strategy for approaching Japan. The war plan of 1911, which was drafted under Rear Admiral Raymond P. Navy began to draft, as early as 1897, war plans against Japan, which were eventually code-named " War Plan Orange". (1893) and by Japan's objections to discrimination against Japanese immigrants both in Hawaii (1897) – on this occasion, Japan sent the cruiser Naniwa to Honolulu, Hawaii – and in California (1906, 1913). This antagonism was intensified by Japan's objections to an attempt to annex Hawaii to the U.S. began to regard Japan as a potential threat to its interests in the western Pacific. ![]() After Japan's victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the U.S. had gained as a result of the Spanish–American War (1898). ![]() ![]() had several interests in the western Pacific to defend namely, access to the Chinese market, and its colonies – the Philippines and Guam – which the U.S. ![]()
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